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Inclusive governance  
in non-profit organisations 
 
 
   
 
Abstract 
The study of private non-profit enterprises that offer general interest services is only at the 
start. The understanding of existing organisations resists an inclusive, public interest view of 
governance. This contribution aims at providing a reflection on specific features that non-profit 
enterprises should have, and outlines four main justifications for including stakeholders in 
production governance: 1) access to knowledge and other resources, 2) trust creation, 3) 
internal efficiency, 4) external efficiency. Conclusions elaborate on Hansmann’s classic theory 
of the firm to suggest that governance solutions need to be assessed on the basis of total costs, 
considering also the lower level of social costs that is created when governance includes 
relevant stakeholders. Our model highlights that when social costs are high, even an enterprise 
with costly decisional processes, such as the multi-stakeholder, can be the most efficient 
solution amongst other possible alternatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
“The only form of enduring social organization that is now possible is one 
in which the new forces of productivity are cooperatively controlled and 
used in the interest of the effective liberty and the cultural development of 
the individuals that constitute society. Such a social order cannot be 
established by an unplanned and external convergence of the actions of 
separate individuals, each of whom is bent on personal private advantage. 
This idea is the Achilles heel of early liberalism” (Dewey, 1935, pp. 628). 
 
1. Introduction 
In European countries the social and personal service sector is facing increasing difficulties. 
The demand and complexity of the services is growing and resources have been shrinking (Cf. 
OECD, 2014i). The problem is especially relevant since social and personal services (e.g. health, 
education, social housing, libraries, arts) impact, more than other goods and services, on the 
welfare of communities and of particular groups of stakeholders within them. Most of the 
personal services can be conceived, in principle, as private goods (since they can be excludable 
and rivalrous), but they may be regarded, at least in part, as common goods when communities 
value open and equal access to these services independently of the users’ capability to pay, and 
when they generate community value (Borzaga, 2015). Still, social service provision requires 
specific consideration, since (differently from other types of commons, such as infrastructural 
goods) they are offered within territorially-defined communities, they may target specific 
groups of individuals, or are conceived to support users with personalised needs, exceptional 
difficulties, risk of social exclusion and scarce ability to pay. Social services are also goods with 
a marked re-distributive connotation, when for example price discrimination is applied in 
favour of the weakest categories of beneficiaries, to whom services can be offered gratuitously 
(Borzaga and Tortia, 2010). Because of these features social services can be considered as 
“fundamental goods,” a specific type of “common” good, whose production is organised flexibly 
to provide towards the fundamental needs of distinct categories of users (Borzaga, 2015). At 
the same time, however, because the effects of fundamental goods transcend their direct users 
and impact on society more broadly (e.g. by increasing the possibility to engage with 
production activities, increasing trust, social inclusion, and equality), their provision generates 
public value and has therefore a distinct general interest relevance.  
Because of their public interest implications, the provision of fundamental goods and their 
governance continue posing a number of questions to scholars, policy makers and practitioners. 
Differently from goods that are solely private or public, these private common goods are or may 
be provided alternatively by for-profit corporations, public providers, not-for-profit 
organisations. Most answers are on variants of public and private systems with the familiar 
shortcomings associated with each (Weisbrod, 1988). On the one hand, private for profit firms 
avoid engaging in a low profit sector and tend to supply low quality output whenever services 
embed complex specialist knowledge and monitoring is imperfect, thus forcing the public 
sector to eventually grant large incentives to providers. Conventional investor-ownership 
moreover is argued to affect the destination of surplus and initial investment decisions, not 
necessarily in the best interests of other stakeholders. For these reasons the sector is argued to 
require both public policy (e.g. in the form of regulation, monitoring and enforcement) and in 
many cases the direct provision by public authorities. On the other hand, however, public 
provision is not always able to capture demand and to satisfy it entirely, since it tends to be 
casted around the median voter and prescribe uniformity on the services offered (Rose-
Ackerman, 1996), but also because of an increasing scarcity of financial resources. Moreover, 
bureaucracy may cause efficiency problems. 
Non-profit organizations have demonstrated to be, and have long been considered an 
alternative way to respond to these challenges. These organisations have been argued to be 
able to serve the welfare of users or other stakeholders for three main reasons. The first is their 
aim, which is designed around local societal challenges and production of public value. The 
second is the allocation of property and control rights to stakeholders different from investors. 
In principle, not-for-profit organisations do not have an incentive to exploit information 
asymmetries to reward investors at the expenses of other interests. In fact, non-profit firms can 
allocate property and control rights to a variety of stakeholders, including users (Ben-Ner, 
1986; Ben Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1991; Hansmann, 1996; Mori, 2013). The third reason is 
the non-distribution constraint, which allows firms to operate with a public interest remit.  
While traditional non-profit organizations were mainly playing an advocacy role (especially in 
Europe) and were characterized by the non-profit distribution constraint (as in countries with 
a widespread cooperative tradition), in the last decades new not-for-profit providers have 
emerged. These are characterized by the commitment to service production, not always with a 
total profit-distribution constraint. Governance-wise, the organisational configuration is 
inclusive of different types of stakeholders, and are increasingly denominated social 
enterprises. Inclusive governance is the most innovative feature of the new non-profit 
organisations, which has been underlined since the first contributions, for example in the 
working definition used by the EMES network, as well as by several European laws. Within 
EMES, Defourny and Nyssens (2008), in particular, recognise social enterprises:  
“... not-for-proﬁt private organizations providing goods or services directly related to 
their explicit aim to beneﬁt the community. They rely on a collective dynamic involving 
various types of stakeholders in their governing bodies, they place a high value on their 
autonomy and they bear economic risks linked to their activity” (Defourny and Nyssens, 
2008: 204).  
 
Social enterprises have spread over the last decade, receiving attention from scholars and 
policy makers alike, as indicated by Europe’s recent Social Business Initiative (2011-2014), as 
well as by the European research scenario, which advocates the need for research that 
addresses “the development of new forms of organisations and interactions to respond to 
societal challenges” as a response to community needs (NET4SOCIETY, 2014: 21). Consistently 
with the first definition outlined above, the Social Business Initiative identifies the foundational 
elements of the social enterprise which support the production of public value (EESC, 2012). 
This work summarises these elements along three characteristics: 1) the social objective, 2) 
limited profit distribution, and 3) inclusive governance, participation and co-decision (i.e. of 
workers, users, members).  
 
This paper focuses on “inclusive governance,” that is the last of the three features of social 
enterprises highlighted above. The reason for concentrating on this element is that governance 
forms that include multiple stakeholders, and are participated by stakeholders (e.g. users, 
employees, volounteers, suppliers and contractors, public sector organisations, families, other 
community constituencies, donors and investors) underpin and facilitate also the other two 
characteristics (i.e. limited profit distribution and having a social objective). It is quite striking, 
however, that inclusive governance remains largely unattended by scholars of social 
enterprises. The modalities of stakeholders’ participation and its effects are often taken for 
granted and have not been fully researched to date: it still remains unclear: why inclusive 
governance is needed, what are its advantages, and how it can be realised in practice (in terms 
of structures, rules, practices).  
Whilst initial studies are being developed on the third issue (the structural features of inclusive 
governance, Cf. Borzaga and Depedri, 2014), on the first two instances there has been no 
attention paid to whether and how governance arrangements in social enterprises contribute 
to the creation of public value, assessed in terms of: 1) specific outcomes generated on 
stakeholders (considered, for example, in terms of service innovation, improved wellbeing and 
social inclusion for weaker groups of individuals, savings in public welfare expenditures), 2) 
broader effects on the community as creation of public value (for example in terms of creation 
of income equality, social inclusion, social capital, democratic skills and civic engagement, 
environmental regeneration and safety, criminality rates). Rather, governance studies tend to 
emphasise how stakeholder inclusion in the governance of the organisation increases 
ownership costs (Hansmann, 1996; Birchall, 2014). 
Differently, this work conceptualises and hypothesises positive outcomes and public value 
creation as a function of the inclusion of multiple interests in the strategic decision-making 
functions of the social enterprise, which is typically defined (albeit not exclusively) by its 
governance structure and praxis. The paper proceeds by outlining four main justifications for 
the inclusion of stakeholders in production governance, namely: 1) access to knowledge and 
other resources, 2) trust creation, 3) internal efficiency, 4) external efficiency. The paper 
concludes by elaborating on Hansmann’s classic theory of the firm to provide a justification for 
inclusive governance which considers external efficiency, besides ownership and contractual 
costs, and reinforcing also knowledge creation and trust amongst the elements that determine 
internal efficiency. 
 
2. Governance: A Critical Perspective 
Governance refers to the structures and processes that define the strategic choices of an 
organization, the direction and monitoring of activities. Studying governance in social 
enterprises means to recognise who is responsible for the identification of societal needs, for 
the design of services, for surplus distribution, or for defining the inter-organisational division 
of labour along the value chain of service provision. These choices have clear implications for 
community prosperity and for the welfare of each stakeholder specifically (Gereffi, 1994; 
Cowling and Sugden, 1998; Kaplinsky, 2000; Cornforth, 2012; Sacchetti and Sugden, 2009). 
In the case of social and personal services, the interaction between demand and supply unfolds 
into a complex interchange between a variety of stakeholders with different roles and 
experience, albeit potentially accomodable interests. To illustrate, in many of the health and 
social-related services, the main stakeholders are those who, for diverse reasons, have a 
disadvantage. Users or patients are clearly those individuals whose life quality is directly 
affected by the nature of the service offered. Close bonds, family members and intimate friends, 
are the next most proximate level of stakeholders, since their life experience is immediately 
interconnected with the one of the user. Furthermore, the nature of activities involves other 
constituencies that operate at community level. These can be involved in the production of 
services whilst, on the other hand, demanding the service. Here we find schools, doctors and 
their practices, city councils, and other profit or non-profit organisations that participate with 
various roles into the design or delivery of health-related services.  
This broad range of interests and the variety of resources that conflates into the production of 
value added put the theory of shareholder primacy under strain. According to scholarly 
literature, in firms owned by shareholders, managers have the fiduciary duty to maximise the 
interests of the latter. This has been typically identified with revenue maximisation and 
distribution to shareholders. However, if the fiduciary duty were to be extended to other 
stakeholders, managers could justify offering lower service rates to beneficiaries, allocate 
resources to the development of inclusive practices towards users and workers, or invest in co-
producing innovative services jointly with private or public sector clients and suppliers. 
Pursuing these goals would not have to be necessarily functional to the maximisation of 
shareholders’ interests. Given managers’ duties, the perspective needs to encompass a change 
in the controlling function of the organisation.  More generally this work argues that, in order 
for managers to respond to a wider set of interests, the design of the governing bodies of the 
organisation needs to allow for stakeholders partaking in the strategic control of the firm. In 
this case, the fiduciary duty of managers is extended beyond mono-stakeholder ownership and 
strategic interdependencies must be explicitly recognised (Fulton et al., 2015). 
Increasing the diversity of those who have access to strategic control does not solve the 
problem of good governance, however. Managerial behaviour has always represented a 
challenge for scholars, and has largely dominated managerial and economic theory, which has 
identified solutions in terms of board and regulators’ control over managers’ actions (Birchall, 
2014). For the principal-agent theory, good governance requires the existence of monetary 
incentives and processes that ensure the liability of management to the main patron of the 
company (Cf Gregory-Smith and Main, 2015 for discussion). “Governance failure,” in this sense, 
puts emphasis on reactive measures in the face of opportunism and corruption, greed and 
short-terminism (OECD, 2004). Complementary, as Cornforth (2003) and Reid (2014) observe, 
managerial hegemony theory addresses the problem in terms of the power asymmetry 
between the management and the board, in terms of uneven distribution of access to 
information, accountability, specific skills and expertise. 
These considerations have been applied mostly to managers and workers, with the aim of 
aligning individual actions with the interests of the organisation, whether this is for-profit or 
not-for-profit (Cf. Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). Using the same approach, Cornforth (2004), 
Spear, (2004), and Birchall (2013) have framed the problem of governance in cooperative 
organisations.  
The same problem of asymmetries and opportunistic behaviour, suggests a different stand on 
governance. Building on the strategic failure approach developed by Cowling, Sugden, and 
colleagues (Cf. Cowling and Sugden, 1998 amongst others), we observe that besides bounded 
cognition and information asymmetries, the problem of “public value deficit” lays in the 
concentration of strategic decision-making power and control with a single stakeholder 
(Sacchetti and Sugden, 2010). What follows is a failure of production governance to recognise 
multiple needs in production choices.  
One could argue that the problem of marginalisation of multiple stakeholders could be, in part, 
addressed via the contractual system, when markets are competitive and contract law is well 
defined. For example, contracts can be written with the public sector for the design and supply 
of services, with creditors when activities are funded through debt, with workers and 
volunteers, and with service users. From transaction cost theory, however, we know that 
writing complete contracts can be costly or even impossible in the case of large asymmetries, 
risk and uncertainty, because of the hazards that the opportunism of decision-makers would 
create to users, workers, suppliers, creditors, and investors (Williamson, 1988; Heath, 2011). 
Transaction cost theory suggests that hierarchical bureaucracy is the solution when contracts 
cannot be specified satisfactorily. However, this theory suggests also that control over decision-
making should be given to one stakeholder only, generally the one who bears is more penalised 
by market failure (Hansmann, 1988). The inclusion of multiple stakeholders is not considered, 
since heterogeneity of interests would harm internal efficiency. So, albeit transaction cost 
theory recognises that inclusion in governance is the solution to contract incompleteness and 
information asymmetries, it does not justify the presence of multiple stakeholders. In other 
words, internal efficiency is obtained by means of the exclusive control of one stakeholder, 
whilst other interests are safeguarded by means of contracts.  
However, a complete analysis of governance failure exceeds the transaction cost sphere. In the 
absence of inclusive governance, perfecting market contracts (in a context of uncertainty and 
power asymmetry), the reduction of information asymmetries and opportunism (reached by 
some degree of contract-based cooperation), or improved cognitive abilities of decision makers 
(reached by means of more effective use of information) do not lead necessarily to the 
recognition and empowerment of multiple and collective needs. In other words, improvements 
in contracts, incentives, information and cognitive skills are not sufficient conditions to solve 
deficits in stakeholder welfare and public value creation. 
Rather, there is a problem in the structure and method used to formulate decisions. Mono-
stakeholder control, as a governance solution, and command-and-control as the method of 
interaction cause a deficit of participation, knowledge, trust and efficiency in decision-making. 
To consider these aspects, decisions need to be formulated by including those affected and their 
interests. This is not the norm when governance forms include only one stakeholder. An 
explanation comes from Cowling and Sugden (1998), for whom decision-makers, whether 
managers or patrons, do not minimise costs (as assumed by transaction cost theory), but maximise 
their own interest, whatever that is. With exclusive decision-making power, “opportunistic” 
decisions may incur even though the excluded parties are aware of it and share the same 
information and understanding, i.e. even if there is not an information asymmetry problem or 
a managerial hegemony problem. Our take of opportunism is related to the exclusion of others’ 
interests from decision-making. In this case, the decision maker acts opportunistically when, 
informed about multiple needs and possible solutions, s/he still prefers to act exclusively, i.e. 
despite the interests of others (Sacchetti, 2015). Even from a transaction cost approach this is 
plausible, since with the decision-making power asymmetry, those excluded from governance 
cannot sanction the decision maker, even if they wanted (they could walk away, but for many 
social and health services this may not be an option). This holds when stakeholders do not have 
access, or the capability to access, proper alternative responses to their needs.  
Consider medical doctors. Doctors represent the scientific community which holds the 
necessary knowledge to prevent, diagnose and cure illnesses. They use this knowledge to 
control the health expenditures on behalf of the public sector. Patients are subject to the 
doctors’ care and judgement since the decision-making power, information asymmetry and 
understanding is usually large. Doctors are therefore in a position to eventually use that 
asymmetry to their own advantage even at the detriment of patients (e.g. by not dedicating the 
required attention to each patient). In the case of health and personal services, the exploitation 
of information and power asymmetries would directly affect specific stakeholders, and cause a 
failure to produce public value. For example, it may prolong recovery times or make some 
patients chronic because not involved, it may cause hazard to patients, distrust in the medical 
community, the persistence of social exclusion for patients and carers, and inequality at societal 
level.  
Likewise, the providing organisation (public sector, or a health-related enterprise) could 
behave opportunistically towards doctors and patients, by not providing the required 
conditions that are necessary to offer quality healthcare, for example by incentivising doctors 
to control expenditures for prevention, diagnosis and care despite implications for the patients. 
Whoever is the provider, exclusive governance fails to achieve socially desired ends.  
3. Multi-stakeholder solutions 
 
In response, this work defines inclusion as a form of governance by which the strategic direction 
and control of the firm are exerted by a plurality of stakeholders who share aims and values, 
whether such functions are held through ownership or by other coordination mechanisms, as long 
as they are recognised in the statutory rules of the firm and implemented (empowerment).  
In this work, multi-stakeholdership is considered as a specific type of inclusive governance, 
which is gaining considerable diffusion. Consider, for example, recent multi-stakeholder 
cooperatives that provide social and personal services in Italy. These are owned and/or 
controlled by a variety of patrons (such as workers, public bodies, volunteers, suppliers, users). 
Using original survey data (ICSI Database, 2007), Borzaga et al. (2011) have undertaken an 
effort to map the governance status of these organisations. They evidence that nearly 80 
percent of enterprises providing personal, social and work integration services feature some 
form of multiple stakeholder involvement.ii Sacchetti and Tortia (2014), consistently, show 
cases in which a dynamic and inclusive approach to the governance of social enterprises 
capitalise on the resources of multiple patrons at different levels, by involving them as member 
owners (e.g. disadvantaged workers and volunteers) or by including them in the board of 
directors (e.g. public administration, job centres, client and supplier organisations, parent 
associations). 
The inclusion of stakeholders is a challenging process for organisations, which requires, 
amongst other things, re-thinking the distribution of organisational resources, and the 
decision-making process. Multi-stakeholdership (in the membership and/or in the board) 
historically emerges from an evolving “percorso” during which the enterprise interprets 
community unmet needs, contextual changes (e.g. in service demand, in the legal framework), 
or stakeholders’ changing preferences on engagement and participation, and creates the 
organisational conditions for the inclusion of each emerging stakeholder (for example, the 
inclusion of workers with disabilities as members may require the introduction of a 
psychologist within the organisation and the reformulation of human resource strategies). As a 
result, a gradually growing network of stakeholders gains voice in the definition socio-
economic activities and creates space to stakeholders and community interests (Borzaga and 
Ianes, 2011; Sacchetti and Tortia, 2014; Borzaga and Depedri, 2014;) 
In other cases, multi-stakeholdership is the product of a more formal institutional framework, 
or a mix of the two, i.e. when the law reflects successful organisational experiences. In fact, 
similar organisations in different countries follow the principles of a mixed membership 
approach because required by law. For example, the French law on SCIC (Société Coopérative 
d’Intérêt Collectif) provides for three types of members being represented in the board: 
workers and beneficiaries, plus a third category to be nominated. In some cases, public 
administration or private for-profit organisations can also be members of a social enterprise, 
e.g. in France and in Spain. 
But why inclusive governance, in the form of multi-stakeholdership, has emerged? And what 
can be the main justification for including more than one interested party in the governing 
bodies of the organisation?   
 
4. Inclusion, access to knowledge and other resources 
A first justification revolves around knowledge. In existing experiences, governance solutions 
that include multiple stakeholders aim at providing fundamental services in a novel way with 
respect to standard public sector provision. The presence of these inclusive governance 
solutions suggests that failure is not exclusively generated by the behaviour of managers, 
directors, and regulators. Rather, it may be generated by a failure in acknowledging the 
interaction amongst the interests and experiences of a diversity of stakeholders. Despite being 
excluded and marginalised by prevailing governance forms, each and every stakeholder has the 
potential to contribute to the definition of needs and modalities by bringing its own experience 
and perspective into the process of choice (Cf. Dewey, 1927). This consideration is even more 
pertinent in the context of social and health services. 
An inclusive account of governance helps to acknowledge (to know) the nature of the needs to 
be addressed, their diversity, and the complexity of the interactions between actors who 
demand and supply the service, the resources that each actor can deploy, thus reducing the 
public value deficit (Sacchetti, 2015). For example, within the encompassing stakeholder 
category defined as “the patient” we find multiple needs, interests, and power where resources 
have to be allocated amongst the prevention, diagnosis and cure of different illnesses. This is 
true also for other types of stakeholders, such as investors in investor-owned firms, workers in 
worker cooperatives or consumers in consumer cooperatives. There are, in other words, 
multiple interests also in so-called mono-stakeholder organisations, to which our analysis also 
applies. 
Together with each and every actor’s specific and contextual knowledge, inclusive governance 
recovers other related immaterial resources, such as actors’ social capital, pro-social 
motivation and creativity. This function of governance is different from that of contracts, which 
are not suitable to capture the non-monetary and unselfish elements of stakeholder 
participation, i.e. contracts do not reward for the use of resources and motivations that cannot 
be monetised.  
In parallel, because inclusive governance offers an environment where actors can directly 
influence decision-making, stakeholders will be keener to input material resources, such as 
voluntary work, membership fees, donations that they would not otherwise deploy in other 
sectors. Inclusive governance, therefore, facilitate recovering resources that management can 
then apply to support the needs and solutions identified by the governing bodies.  
The effectiveness of inclusive governance to highlight and acquire material and immaterial 
resources provides also an indication of the capability of the organisation to identify needs and 
opportunities, and develop desirable solutions. It also gives an indication of the legitimacy that 
the non-profit organisation has and of its capacity to generate value for specific stakeholders 
and for society more generally (Moore, 2003; Moore and Hartley, 2008). 
 
5. Inclusion and Trust 
The second justification for inclusive governance is its trust-enabling function. Economic 
literature suggests that the non-distribution constraint makes firms to operate with a public 
interest remit. Stakeholders, accordingly, would trust that the non-profit organisation produces 
public value because there are no incentives to fail stakeholders, and the community overall, in 
order to reward capital (Ben-Ner, 1986; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). The non-distribution 
constraint holds, in this sense, a legitimisation function. But, as Hansmann (1996) notices, this 
is a “rude protection device.” Our inclusive governance approach suggests that, even in the 
presence of a non-distribution constraint, the controlling stakeholder can still use the decision-
making power asymmetry to pursue its own interest to the detriment of others, and fail to 
produce public value. For example, managers’ and workers’ interests can be pursued to the 
detriment of users when surplus is reduced by means of unjustified higher salaries rather than, 
for instance, lower prices for those in need. Or, vice versa, emphasis can be placed on some 
users’ welfare to the detriment of other groups of users or of the interests of workers. 
Rather than relying exclusively on limits to surplus distribution, trust is at the heart of the direct 
involvement of stakeholders in the organisation’s governance (Cf. also Fairbairn et al., 2015). 
Specifically when talking social enterprise, trust is based – at least initially – on shared 
participatory and solidaristic values. These specific values are credible since they are 
embedded in the inclusive governance structure and cooperative praxis of the organisation. To 
illustrate, constitutionally, inclusive and pro-social values are recognised by the statutory rules 
of the organisation. Organisationally, they are embodied in the composition of the membership 
and of the board. Finally, operationally these features imply high standards of decision-making 
by discussion, cooperation, procedural and relational fairness amongst stakeholders (Borzaga 
and Tortia, 2015; Leventhal, 1980; Sacchetti and Tortia, 2013; Tyler and Blader, 2000). With 
procedural and relational fairness, stakeholders’ voice is enabled not only by pro-social 
principles, formal structures and distribution of control rights, but also empowered by a culture 
of communication and engagement (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2013). These features have been 
argued to build on and, at the same time, foster trust, as well as actors’ motivation to take part 
and cooperate amongst each other (Ostrom 2010; Deci and Ryan, 2008). From this angle, and 
consistently with Bradach and Eccles (1989), Möllering (2002), and Borzaga and Tortia (2015), 
cooperation amongst stakeholders is based on the shared belief or trust that the values of the 
organisation are implemented by each and every actor through the enabling role of inclusive 
governance and consistent organisational solutions. These do not exclude managerial control 
or contract-based coordination, but attach to these two mechanisms an auxiliary role. 
 
 
 
6. Inclusion and Internal Efficiency 
For transaction cost theory, coordination amongst multiple and potentially conflicting interests 
requires the costly design of incentives, monitoring and control mechanisms. More trust equals 
more transparency, less opportunistic behaviours, and less need for bureaucratic control (Cf. 
Möllering, 2002 for a discussion). However, in line with Borzaga and Tortia, (2015), Thompson 
(2015) and Valentinov (2004), the argument is that the quality of the public value produced 
through the provision of fundamental goods is related to a “deeper level of cooperation” than 
the one achieved through market contracts and managerial hierarchies. We have further argued 
that deep-level cooperation can be achieved through the knowledge and trust-enabling 
function of inclusive governance arrangements. 
Deeper cooperation requires the inclusion of stakeholders in governance, whereby conflicts are 
resolved because each actor has the power to present instances, trusting that such instances 
would be acknowledged and considered in the light of wider and more general interests than 
those represented by each single stakeholder (Dewey, 1963). Building on an organisational 
context that expresses participatory and pro-social values that selects in large part pro-social 
actors, each actor is less likely to behave selfishly, or to use its decision-making power to pursue 
exclusive advantages. With inclusive governance, cooperation is based on enabling governance 
rules and relational elements mostly, leaving to managerial control a complementary but more 
marginal coordination role. It is the prevalence of deep-level cooperation, in fact, that reduces 
the need for command-and-control and lowers coordination costs (Aoki, 1984; Borzaga and 
Tortia, 2015; Fitzroy and Kraft, 1986; Putterman, 1984; Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003; Thomson, 
2015).  
 
7. Inclusion and External Efficiency 
The main feature of the inclusive governance approach is that stakeholders and society at large 
can benefit of the outcomes and public value created by a cooperative approach to the use of 
resources. Measurement literature has defined the outcome of a non-profit organization as the 
‘‘state of the target population or the social condition that a program is supposed to have 
changed’’ (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman, 2004, 204; Cf. also Lee and Nowell 2015 for a review of 
performance measurement categories). The focus is on changes in the behavioural and 
environmental conditions that the social enterprise, through its activities, has contributed to 
generate on specific groups (Bagnoli and Megali, 2011). In parallel, public value scholars such 
as Hills and Sullivan (2006) have operationalised non-profit organisations’ broader effects on 
society in terms of quality of life, well-being, and happiness; social capital, social cohesion and 
inclusion; safety and security; equality, deprivation, and social exclusion; promotion of 
democracy and civic engagement (Lee and Nowell, 2015). 
Conversely, when exclusive interests prevail, even despite those of others, exclusive 
governance creates a deficit in the capacity of communities to generate public value and meet 
socio-economic needs (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2010). In the case of health and personal services, 
exclusion produces both stakeholder-specific effects, such as insufficient, excessively standard 
and parcelled services, persistence of problems affecting the weakest groups, fragmentation of 
service production and labour functions, and systemic effects across society. Systemically, 
restricted access to decision-making, to connections, and to opportunities for civic engagement 
creates a barrier to social integration, to the diffusion of trust, cooperation and democratic 
attitudes across society as a whole public, thus reinforcing the public value deficit (Dewey, 
1927; Hirschmann, 2002; Sacchetti et al., 2009).  More generally, excluding all but one 
stakeholder, as a governance system and as a method of decision-making, contributes to 
accentuate the incoherence between community needs and those expressed by the production 
system, furthering the distance between production choices and community development 
objectives (Mori, 2014; Sacchetti, 2015; Sacchetti and Sugden, 2010; Sugden and Wilson, 
2002).iii  
The analysis considers two types of interacting “public” impacts: on specific groups (specific 
effects or outcomes); generalisable to the entire community (systemic effects or public value). 
Whilst specific effects (or outcomes) are excludable, systemic effects (or public value) are non-
excludable effects of production governance and processes. Albeit no specific effect is totally 
isolated, and each and every choice interacts to some extent with other interests, specific effects 
are those that fall, mainly, on specific groups.  
The interconnections between governance and public impacts are illustrated in Figure 1 
(where the dots between governance and impacts allude to the organisation of production 
across the value chain, analysed in Borzaga and Sacchetti, 2015).  
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Public impacts 
 
 
 
 
Of the two types of effects (specific and systemic), political economists focus mainly on systemic 
effects. These, as mentioned, are deficits in public value which essentially refer to market 
externalities: “uncompensated interdependencies” due to the absence of markets, which can 
produce social benefits or social costs (Cornes and Sandler, 1996).  
Cowling and Sugden (1994), differently, identify societal costs with the “strategic failure” of 
exclusive production governance. Consistently with their concerns, Meade (1979) centres his 
definition of externalities on the exclusion of the affected parties from the decisions that led to 
the external economy or diseconomy.iv This interpretation of externalities explains their 
existence by pointing at the exclusion of stakeholders’ interests (rather than to the absence of 
markets). The approach allows also to position effects which cannot be monetised, since the 
focus is on the nature of decision-making rather than on the entity of the external effect (which 
is rather a consequence of governance structure and processes). The crucial point of this 
interpretation is that negative public impacts (on specific stakeholders and communities) are 
due to a governance failure rather than to a market failure. In the first type of failure exclusion 
is purposeful, since it is the governance level that prevents inclusion and desired impacts. In 
the latter, conversely, exclusion and its impacts are due to the absence of markets and therefore 
conceived as involuntary.  
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8. Extending Hansmann 
Following Hansmann’s argument, the prevailing economic approach to governance supports 
the view that trying to pursue the interests of multiple patrons makes the firm less efficient, for 
example with respect to mono-stakeholder competitors (Hansmann, 1996; Birchall, 2014). The 
inclusion of multiple interests, in particular, may generate conflict over the distribution of the 
value added or over other strategic decisions. Business ethicists arguing in favour of 
multifiduciary stakeholder theory (whereby different stakeholder interests are pursued by the 
board of directors) have been contested on the grounds provided by Hansmann’s theory 
(Heath, 2011). 
In explaining the ownership of enterprises, Hansmann’s law states that the efficient allocation 
of property rights occurs by minimising total costs: those related to ownership (CP) and those 
associated with the use of market contracting (CC). Given these costs, according to Hansmann, 
the ownership of the firm goes to the stakeholder who minimises the sum of the costs of market 
contracting (CC) and the costs of ownership (CP): 
𝐶𝑃𝑗 +∑𝐶𝐶𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1
 
Differently, when stakeholders have heterogeneous interests, Hansmann’s model predicts that 
property costs rise, since the alignment of aims requires greater coordination and monitoring. 
It follows, in Hansmann’s model, one patron can have a representation and a decision-making 
role in the board of directors, whilst all other stakeholders are coordinated via contracts. Albeit 
Hansmann does not consider multi-stakeholdership, his perspective would suggest that multi-
stakeholder ownership is extraordinary costly and therefore economically not sustainable. The 
costs derived from the exclusion of stakeholders are not considered. 
This claim, however, needs to be re-assessed in light of the public value deficits and specific 
negative effects produced by exclusive governance. We have argued that decision makers 
maximise their own interests, which may not coincide with minimisation of total costs, 
including those produced on excluded stakeholders and society. In the presence of decision-
making power asymmetries, then, governance fails to identify needs, resources, and answers. 
Without including the interested stakeholders, therefore, an array of social costs are generated. 
On the contrary, including stakeholders implies governance innovation so that costs are 
recognised in their entirety. The governance structure changes and with it the distribution of 
resources, decision-making power, and outcomes. In non-profit organisations, governance 
changes which increase inclusiveness aim at creating positive outcomes, public value, and to 
avoid the production of social costs. The historical evolution towards multi-stakeholdership 
can be taken as an indicator of the relevance of the social costs in the calculation of total costs. 
Moreover, against Hansmann’s claim for homogeneity, successful experiences shows the 
potential marginality of ownership costs with diverse stakeholders. We have explained this 
with the central role of inclusive and pro-social values embedded in governance rules and trust-
based cooperative practices, which allow the use of resources that otherwise would not be 
utilised. We have also noticed that the interests of external stakeholders cannot be entirely 
captured by contracts. Albeit contracts can partly compensate for exclusion, we have argued 
that some of the costs of exclusion are of non-monetary nature, and cannot be captured through 
contracts. Some others are of more general nature, they touch upon society as a whole and 
exceed specific stakeholders. Contracts, therefore, are applied to stakeholders for which 
immaterial elements can be recovered otherwise, or when such elements are not relevant.  
Following these considerations, the costs of exclusion can be regarded as greater than zero. 
Therefore, we advance Hansmann’s model by adding the costs associated with exclusion. Whilst 
price and quantity-related inefficiencies caused by ex-ante and ex-post market power are 
typically included among contractual costs (CC), the costs of exclusion (CE) derive from the 
exclusion of stakeholders from decision-making whose utility cannot be captured through 
contracts (specific and systemic effects, as in Figure 1). We assume that in order to maximise 
their own utility collectively (cooperative outcomes and public value), stakeholders must 
consider total costs, i.e. the sum of contractual costs, ownership costs and costs of exclusion.  
Given a number of stakeholders, 𝑁, who interact (directly or indirectly, informally or on a 
contractual basis) with the organisation, governance choices regarding the inclusion of 
stakeholders (IS) into the governance structure considers property costs (CP), contractual costs 
(CC), and the negative external impacts produced or costs of exclusion (CE). We suggest that 
the choice of whether to include new stakeholders (IS) needs considering CP, CC and CE 
together.   
∑(𝐶𝑃𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝐸𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Property costs (CP) are dynamic in our model, and change with the number of stakeholders 
included. The inclusion of one more stakeholder implies an increase in CP and a change in the 
distribution of resources and outcomes, which lowers the costs of exclusion (CE). At the same 
time, contractual costs (CC) decrease since coordination with newly involved stakeholders does 
not occur through contracts anymore. In order for CE to be zero, contracts should remain in 
place only with those stakeholders whose utility is satisfied exclusively through the market 
mechanism, a possibility which transaction cost theory regards as not possible.  
The most efficient firm, for this model, is one for which total costs are the lowest. The model is 
therefore useful to compare multiple governance solutions on the basis of the total level of costs 
generated. Following this construct, Hansmann’s model would be a specific solution that can be 
applied only when CE are very low. 
 
9. Conclusions 
The study of inclusive governance (and multi-stakeholder social enterprises in particular) is 
only at the start. Entrepreneurial choices which have emerged spontaneously, as well as the 
first legal frameworks approved in this direction, lack an adequate theoretical support. The 
debate itself requires development, as the existing understanding of organisations and their 
aims resist an inclusive, public interest view of enterprise. This contribution has aimed at 
enriching the thin theoretical reflections on inclusive governance and multi-stakeholdership in 
fundamental services, providing examples from a context where they have already appeared, 
i.e. that of health and personal services.  
Social costs, in our model, are not a transitory feature of conventional market organisations or 
of the public sector but an intrinsic consequence of governance failures caused by exclusive 
processes determined by mono-stakeholder approaches to governance (see also Borzaga and 
Tortia, 2005; Zamagni, 2005). In order to reduce social costs, it is therefore necessary to act on 
governance structures and decision-making, moving away from conventional mono-
stakeholder forms (whether the organisation is privately or publicly owned) towards inclusive 
organisations based on a mix of coordination mechanisms - inclusion and cooperation, control, 
contracts - but where the prevailing mechanism is the first. It follows that inclusive governance 
and cooperation do not have a transitional character but represent specific solutions which 
recognise the complexity and richness of public interests and of production structures, with the 
aim of addressing multiple welfare aspects. Consistently, the duty of managers is to discover 
stakeholders and support governance innovations that engage multiple actors in the governing 
bodies, since stakeholders’ interests can be taken into account if, in the first place, they are not 
anonymous and if they are not removed from the strategic choices. 
The key insight of this work is that, differently from major interpretations, property costs 
should be considered in conjunction with a more comprehensive range of costs, such as the 
social costs that emerge when the supply of social and personal services is insufficient or when 
the identification of aims and means is not shared amongst stakeholders. Our model highlights 
that when social costs derived from exclusion are high, an organisation with costly decisional 
processes, such as the multi-stakeholder, can be (and often is) the most efficient solution 
amongst other possible alternatives. The answer we indicate to the public value deficits and 
persistence of social costs is to design sustainable inclusive governance solutions that are 
consistent with cooperation and shared decision-making power, aimed at reducing the negative 
impacts whilst augmenting the positive ones. Making these interactions explicit is bound to 
generate new ways of integrating the knowledge, resources and needs coming from multiple 
actors. In other words, inclusive governance is more likely to fulfil stakeholder-specific and 
societal needs.  
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driven by cuts in public spending.” (OECD, 2014: http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/health-spending-starts-to-
rise-but-remains-weak-in-europe.htm. Accessed 8 May 2015) 
 
ii Specifically, one out of three social enterprises (34 percent) are multi-stakeholder (albeit, as the authors notice, 
users are included in the membership in one out of 10 social enterprises only), 29 percent are hybrid 
organisations with multiple membership but with a single stakeholder (workers) represented in the board of 
directors, 16 percent have a dual stakeholdership (including workers and volunteers), whilst the remaining 21 
percent are mono-stakeholder (workers) social enterprises. Borzaga and Depedri (2015) have further noticed 
that users (i.e. disadvantaged workers) are members in the majority of social cooperatives that provide work 
integration services (across sectors, e.g. environmental maintenance, manufacturing), whilst the remaining 
cooperatives (typically providing health assistance and educational services) tend not to involve users (ibid.). 
These findings also show that the membership of other organisational types (e.g. public administration units) is 
unusual. Rather, what is rising is the involvement in the membership of other social cooperatives (with whom, 
we would say, a commonality of values, practices and aims exists).  
iii Social capital scholars have argued that communities with poor levels of cooperation generate also less 
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generating non-monetary, systemic negative impacts).  
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